And in this particular limited but important sense, we might say that something akin to musical time does exist. I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal, and I agree that film, novels, and theater are strong examples of genres conforming with it.
Still it is unclear, however, why the authors have omitted poetry from their list, given that it shares with the listed arts the same characteristics in relation to this condition. According to this view, a sequence of, say, a car chase can a be more or less realistically represented in text or on film and b proceed differently from the sequence of, and take more or less time than, the time the actual or imagined car chase takes.
The authors fairly claim that such temporal dislocation and "distemporization" is a hallmark of the novel and film in particular. They quote Susanne Langer in support of their Condition 9, and, if they are to take her and others espousing similar positions, such as Leonard Meyer, at their word, then music might be said to "represent a series of events in time distinct from the series of events constituting the art object. Music, therefore, might be said to represent psychical events in a sequence and time distinct from the way those events occurred in real life and without reference to the agents and events that triggered the psychical events.
Thus music, too, might be exemplary of Condition Plausible as this notion of representation may seem, however, I claim that it is in fact not representation but re-stimulation or re-presentation of emotion that is involved in the case of music. A listener is not aware of any process or representation occurring. Instead, emotions are stimulated in the absence of any representation of or reference to the generating events because music cannot represent or refer in these ways. I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and agree that improvisatory works are exemplary of it.
At the same time, I suggest that re-creation be offered as an alternative to creation in the condition in order to a give greater weight to the role of the interpretive performer of nonimprovisational works and b allow for certain musical activities, including continuo realizing and cadenza playing, in which spontaneous or rehearsed improvisation is part of an otherwise notated work.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and agree that live performances and improvisations are exemplary of it. I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and agree that some folk arts with only oral traditions of transmission are exemplary of it. The authors offer a final, fourteenth condition that, they claim, straddles the previous conditions and the implications of their grouping of them into the three sub-groups referred to earlier.
It reads:. I agree with the authors that "… when an art form is described as "temporal," without any further specification of what is meant, then [Condition 14] Gardens and environmental sculptures provide good examples of arts in which aesthetic appeal and value derive from both temporal and pictorial spatial features of the works. I do not mean to suggest, however, that we can consider or quantify the visual and temporal aspects of such arts as if they are discrete, independent aspects of a work.
They are complexly interwoven, and I believe the condition would be improved were this complexity to be acknowledged. There exists one inescapably important temporal feature that is not considered anywhere in the taxonomy. This feature affects some architecture and installations, all gardens, and some environmental sculpture, and might be reflected in a new condition reading as follows:.
I claim that this proposed condition is of fundamental importance to the art of gardens. The proposed "condition xv," and the content of Section 5 that follows, owe a significant debt to the important pioneering work in the philosophy of art gardens carried out by Mara Miller and Stephanie Ross, and by later writers who have developed similar or related accounts of gardens. In their conclusion, Levinson and Aplerson suggest that their work could be extended by responding to two questions: First, which art is the "most" temporal, and on what basis might that be determined?
And, second, do some of their conditions for temporality carry with them more aesthetic significance than others? I agree with the authors that an Oscars-style response, where the winner is the one with the most votes, would be an unenlightening response to the first question, unless some agreed value was attributed to each aspect of temporality making up their taxonomy.
I further agree with them that to be minimally useful any such ascription of value would need to be couched in the context of a single, higher-level conception of art. I believe their second question is a much more apt one.
But, as I suggest in relation to Condition 14, ensuring that the weighing process produces useful results is not as straightforward as Levinson and Alperson seem to believe. There are two reasons why the weighing process is more complex than the authors acknowledge. First, some art genres, such as gardens, environmental sculpture, and some installations and architecture, are at the same time significantly temporal and significantly pictorial.
They therefore pose the problem of how their temporality is to be weighed. Is it to be weighed as a discrete quality or is it to be weighed as some sort of composite quality?
And then, is it a temporal- pictorial quality or is it a pictorial- temporal quality? Or is it something else again? And, second, even if and when the weighing parameters are clarified, there remains a bigger question to address: Is it possible to make useful and insightful claims about the aesthetic weight of manifestations of temporality in art works in general without regard to the weight or significance of temporality in a specific genre and even in a specific work?
My answer to this question is a qualified yes, and, in particular, I propose that the way temporality is manifested in gardens may have interesting implications for the way we understand the temporal nature of some other arts. As objects, gardens typically display both pictorial spatial and temporal qualities and features. They can be conceptualized as two-dimensional pictures, as three-dimensional sculptures, and as four-dimensional environments.
Gardens are also richly endowed with opportunities for olfactory, kinesthetic, and tactile experiences. As conveyors of content, gardens can be about visual qualities such as beauty and grace, they can represent mimetically, they can in other ways represent concepts such as attitudes to nature or power and dominion, and they can both be about and instantiate time and its passage.
In summary, gardens resist neat categorization as a pictorial or temporal art. Gardens are both, separately, but they function as more, or something different again, when considered as simultaneously pictorial and temporal. Perhaps this feature of art gardens can provide a key to understanding the complex interplay of temporal and other aesthetic modes in different art genres where the interplay is significantly present.
John Powell is a Ph. Levinson and Alperson, p. Jonathan D. Edward N. Zalta Winter Levinson and Alperson p. Eliot , ed. Frank Kermode London: Faber and Faber, They also involve significant aleatory changes, but this is not of interest here.
Julio Cortazar, Hopscotch , trans. Gregory Rabassa New York: Pantheon, This structural device is also commonplace in video- and computer game- art genres. The freedom that "Piano Piece XI" exemplifies is different from the total absence of restraint found in the work of John Cage and others.
The art theorist Lessing classically divides art into two kinds—an art of space and an art of time. Lessing gathers classic sculpture and painting under the art of space; he gathers music and poetry under the art of time. The difference is in how each kind of sign exists in time or space.
Later, cinema was also drawn under the art of time. For example, Eisenstein and Tarkovsky are both influential filmmakers and theorists about time in cinema. For Eisenstein, cinema is an art of time because of its capacity for montage; for Tarkovsky, cinema is an art of time because of its capacity to depict the time of filmed objects e.
Depiction here is not merely representation. We discuss the nature of representation in more depth later in this chapter. For now, the difference is this: many things may be represented by many other things, and there is nothing particular that the representation need share with what it represents.
However, depiction is different. A depiction is in some sense like its object, that is, there is some kind of necessary resemblance between the depiction and what is depicted. For example, a picture depicts some things it represents because it looks in some way like what it represents.
Call art of space spatial art and art of time temporal art. It uses space in its representation or other artistic aspects, such as its aesthetics. For spatial artwork, if there is no space, then there is no artwork.
Faucet vs. Com vs. Destroyable vs. Aboriginal vs. Coelomate vs. Ocean vs. Judge vs. Flag vs. Forbear vs. Awesomely vs. Fat vs. Sonhood vs. Ricochet vs. Channel vs. Trending Comparisons. Mandate vs. Ivermectin vs. Skinwalker vs. Socialism vs. Man vs. Supersonic vs. Gazelle vs. Jem vs. Mouse vs. Lubuntu vs. You vs.
0コメント